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CHASING GHOSTS: PURSUING 
RETROACTIVE JUSTICE FOR FRANCO-ERA 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
Angela M. Guarino* 
Abstract: In October 2008, Judge Baltasar Garzón declared himself com-
petent to open Spain’s first criminal investigation of Franco-era atrocities. 
His decision formally classified the 114,000 executions and thousands of 
forced disappearances that occurred during the Spanish Civil War and 
ensuing dictatorship as crimes against humanity. It also accused Francisco 
Franco and thirty-four of his generals and ministers of having committed 
these crimes. Throughout Spain’s transition to democracy and beyond, 
Spain has adhered to a “pact of forgetting,” formalized by a 1977 amnesty 
law, in which political leaders agreed that regime members would not be 
prosecuted for their acts. Given this traditional silence and the fact that 
the majority of the acts concerned were committed seventy years ago, crit-
ics disputed Judge Garzón’s jurisdiction over the action. This Note con-
siders four jurisdictional obstacles to prosecution and whether interna-
tional law provides a method through which they might be overcome. 
Si muero, El segador siega el trigo. 
dejad el balcón abierto. (Desde mi balcón lo siento.) 
El niño come naranjas. ¡Si muero, 
(Desde mi balcón lo veo.) dejad el balcón abierto! 
—Federico García Lorca, El balcón1 
Introduction 
 Famed Spanish poet and playwright Federico García Lorca penned 
the above verses at the age of twenty-three, fifteen years before his tragic 
execution by a Nationalist firing squad at the beginning of the Spanish 
                                                                                                                      
* Angela M. Guarino is the Executive Articles Editor of the Boston College International 
& Comparative Law Review. She would like to thank her parents for their constant support 
and her Spanish instructors throughout the years for their dedication and encouragement. 
1 Federico García Lorca, El balcón, reprinted in Jason Webster, ¡Guerra!: Living in the 
Shadows of the Spanish Civil War 79–80 (2006). The poem’s translation is: “If I die, / leave 
the balcony open. / The child eats oranges. / (I see him from my balcony.) / The reaper har-
vests the wheat. / (I sense him from my balcony.) / If I die, / leave the balcony open!” (au-
thor’s translation). 
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Civil War.2 His body was thrown into a mass grave in a Granadan moun-
tainside, representing one of several thousand victims of Francoist forces 
whose ties to the defeated Republican side of the Spanish Civil War led 
to the same fate.3 From the beginning of the 1936–1939 War to Franco’s 
death in November 1975, approximately 150,000 Republican lives were 
claimed.4 While Franco’s regime recovered the majority of Nationalist 
victims’ bodies and granted reparations to the winning side for its losses, 
the same treatment certainly was not extended to Republican casualties 
and their families.5 Thousands of individuals “disappeared,” with their 
deaths left unregistered.6 It has been estimated that those buried in 
mass graves could total 100,000 or more.7 
 Traditionally, silence has shrouded the wrongs committed during 
the Civil War and the near forty-year dictatorship that followed.8 After 
Franco’s death, Spaniards and their political leaders chose to leave 
painful memories behind in a “pacto del olvido”(“pact of forgetting”) in 
order to make a peaceful transition to democracy.9 In line with that 
pact, those responsible for the mass suffering of the Franco era were 
never pursued.10 For this reason, Judge Baltasar Garzón’s October 2008 
decision to open Spain’s first criminal investigation into executions 
conducted by Franco and his henchmen was a stunning development.11 
In a sixty-eight page court document, Judge Garzón,12 who sits on the 
Audiencia Nacional, Spain’s highest criminal court, accepted a petition 
filed by thirteen associations of Republican victims’ families seeking 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Dale Fuchs, Judge Orders Investigation of Executions in Franco Era, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
17, 2008, at A8; Marina Montes Pérez, Si muero, dejad el balcón abierto . . . , Elplural.com, 
Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.elplural.com/andalucia/opinion/detail.php?id=24080. 
3 See Webster, supra note 1, at 79; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
4 Mike Elkin, Judge Seeks to Clarify Fate of Franco Victims, Guardian (London), Sept. 3, 
2008, at 20. 
5 See id.; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
6 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and 
Outcomes 188 (2005). 
7 Elkin, supra note 4. 
8 See Webster, supra note 1, at 9; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
9 Webster, supra note 1, at 87; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
10 Ghost Story, Economist, Oct. 25, 2008, at 36. 
11 See Giles Tremlett, Franco Repression Ruled As a Crime Against Humanity, Guardian 
(London), Oct. 17, 2008, at 31. 
12 Judge Garzón’s predilection for challenging legal limits to pursue human rights vio-
lators is well-known. Victoria Burnett, Spanish Judge Drops Inquiry into Atrocities of Franco and 
Allies, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2008, at A7. For instance, in 1998, Garzón had former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet arrested on the general’s visit to London while Garzón endeav-
ored to extradite him to Spain to prosecute him for crimes against humanity. Id.; Ghost 
Story, supra note 10. 
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information surrounding the forced disappearances of thousands.13 In 
this acceptance, Judge Garzón both declared himself competent to in-
vestigate the killings of 114,000 people and ordered the exhumation of 
nineteen mass graves, including that believed to contain the remains of 
Federico García Lorca.14 Most importantly, the judge formally declared 
the atrocities carried out by Franco and his allies as crimes against hu-
manity for the first time, and accused the former dictator and thirty-
four of his generals and ministers of these acts.15 
 Judge Garzón’s controversial October 2008 decision sparked heated 
criticism from Spanish conservatives, who admonished that scrutinizing 
past acts would only reopen old wounds in Spanish society.16 The im-
pending investigation also triggered intense debate in legal circles as to 
whether the judge would even have jurisdiction over the crimes.17 The 
realities that the crimes were covered by an amnesty law passed in 1977 
and committed seventy years ago by now-deceased individuals were chief 
among these concerns; in fact, they were raised by state prosecutors in a 
formal appeal of Judge Garzón’s jurisdiction.18 Following this challenge, 
Judge Garzón ultimately decided to drop the case against Franco and his 
allies on November 18, 2008.19 The judge issued a 152-page statement 
that ceded responsibility to regional courts for opening the nineteen 
mass graves he had ordered exhumed the previous month.20 
 This Note focuses on the various jurisdictional obstacles that stood 
in Judge Garzón’s path in his attempt to try Franco and thirty-four of his 
followers for crimes against humanity, and whether international law 
                                                                                                                      
13 Fuchs, supra note 2; Katherine Iliopolous, Spain’s Memory War: Judge Halts Attempt to 
Enforce Justice for Franco’s Killings, Crimes of War Project, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.crimes 
ofwar.org/onnews/news-spain.html. 
14 Burnett, supra note 12; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
15 Burnett, supra note 12; Tremlett, supra note 11. 
16 See Burnett, supra note 12; Fuchs, supra note 2. 
17 See Rachel Nolan, Reviving Spain’s Ghosts: Judge Looking into Fate of Franco’s Vic-
tims, Spiegel Online Int’l, Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
0,1518,576051,00.html. 
18 See Burnett, supra note 12. In fact, in September 2009, Judge Garzón was called to testify 
before the Spanish Supreme Court in relation to a complaint filed by the right-wing organiza-
tion Manos Limpias (Clean Hands), which avers that, given the 1977 Amnesty Law, Judge 
Garzón knowingly overstepped legal boundaries in pursuing his October 2008 inquiry. Judge 
Garzón in the Dock, Economist, Sept. 12, 2009, at 58; Spanish Judge Faces Supreme Court, BBC 
News Online, Sept. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/ 8245664.stm. 
19 Burnett, supra note 12. 
20 Id. For a copy of Judge Garzón’s statement in its original Spanish, see A.N., Nov. 18, 
2008 (Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 53/2008 E), http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-
spain.html (follow “Judge Garzon’s statement of November 18” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
Judge Garzón’s Statement]. 
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provides an avenue to overcome these obstacles. Part I traces the crimes 
against humanity committed during the Franco era, the reasoning be-
hind the “pact of forgetting,” the 1977 Amnesty Law that blocked prior 
prosecution of the wrongs committed, and the recent movement to-
wards breaking the silence surrounding the atrocities. This section con-
cludes with an introduction to truth commissions as an alternative fo-
rum to seeking justice in cases where traditional criminal prosecution 
may prove unworkable. Part II of the Note weighs the individual juris-
dictional obstacles blocking a possible investigation of Spain’s potential 
obligations under international law to investigate crimes against human-
ity. Part III considers whether, after respecting jurisdictional roadblocks, 
an alternative method to a formal criminal investigation of Franco and 
his allies may still exist in the form of a Spanish truth commission. 
I. Background 
A. Crimes Against Humanity and Francoist Repression 
 Judge Garzón planned to try Franco and thirty-four of his follow-
ers for their responsibility for “mass killings, torture and the systematic, 
general and illegal detentions of political opponents” without disclos-
ing their whereabouts as crimes against humanity.21 Historical accounts 
of Nationalist treatment of Republican forces during the War, as well as 
the Francoist regime’s repressive practices following, indicate an inves-
tigation would find such crimes occurred.22 
 As Richard Herr summarizes, the early stages of the 1936–1939 
Civil War were characterized by “ferocious cruelty.”23 As Nationalist 
forces seized control of cities and towns in the Franco-led military coup 
against the democratically-elected government of the Popular Front,24 
troops would hunt down not only those bearing arms against them, but 
also anyone believed to sympathize with the Republican cause.25 Waves 
                                                                                                                      
21 Tremlett, supra note 11; Iliopoulos, supra note 13. The acts Judge Garzón alleged in 
his October 2008 statement would fit the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against hu-
manity. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
22 See Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain 190, 212 (1971). 
23 Id. at 190. 
24 The Popular Front was an electoral alliance of left-wing parties, including Republi-
cans, Socialists, and the Spanish Communist Party, that won a narrow victory in the 1936 
elections to claim control of the Spanish Parliament. See id. at 181–82. 
25 Id. at 190. These groups included those who had belonged to workers’ and leftist 
organizations, freemasons, and anyone who had supported the Popular Front. Id. Intellec-
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of these individuals were condemned on mere hearsay without trial, 
loaded onto trucks, taken to deserted areas outside city boundaries, 
summarily shot, and buried in mass, shallow graves that began dotting 
the Spanish countryside in the wake of the advancing Nationalists.26 
None of this violence in areas lacking organized armed resistance was 
“necessary” from a military standpoint.27 
 Francoist atrocities persisted even after the official end of the Civil 
War in April 1939, behind the dictator’s philosophy that the vencedores 
(victors) should enjoy their spoils, while the vencidos (vanquished) 
should suffer a cruel repression which included persecution, execution, 
torture, or exile.28 Franco undertook a “reign of terror” upon victory 
whereby via a 1939 law, all persons who had engaged in subversion or 
had opposed the Nationalist regime, even by a demonstrated passivity, 
were considered criminals.29 An estimated one million men were im-
prisoned on this basis, with thousands condemned to death and exe-
cuted outside cities like Madrid and Barcelona at a steady pace through 
1941.30 Explicit orders often precluded the issuance of death certifi-
cates, even in cases of courageous family members willing to identify the 
corpses of the executed.31 Additionally during this period, military 
courts issued life or long-term sentences to hundreds of thousands of 
other victims.32 Large numbers among them perished from disease or 
malnutrition in overcrowded prisons, where individuals were also sub-
ject to frequent humiliation, beatings, and torture.33 
                                                                                                                      
tuals and doctors were especially targeted, as considered political leftists. Gabriel Jack-
son, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War 82 (1974). 
26 Herr, supra note 22, at 190; Michael Richards, A Time of Silence 38 (1998). 
27 Richards, supra note 26, at 38. 
28 Raymond Carr, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy 18–19 (1981). 
29 Herr, supra note 22, at 212. 
30 Id. An estimated 200,000 death sentences were issued during this period. Id. Al-
though the vast majority of post-war executions occurred in the five to six-year period im-
mediately following the war, it should be noted that the Francoist regime continued to 
execute those identified as enemies until the end of the dictatorship in the 1970s. Rich-
ards, supra note 26, at 30. 
31 See Richards, supra note 26, at 30. 
32 Herr, supra note 22, at 212; see Salvadó, supra note 6, at 190. 
33 Herr, supra note 22, at 212; Salvadó, supra note 6, at 190. It should be noted that 
children of alleged Republican-sympathizer parents endured a different type of disappear-
ance during this period. See Victoria Burnett, Families Search for Truth of Spain’s “Lost Chil-
dren,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2009, at A12. It is estimated that hundreds of minors were taken 
from their biological families and adopted or sent to religious schools or state-run homes 
for political reorientation. In some instances, these minors were stripped of their true 
identities and given new ones. Id. 
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B. A “Pact of Forgetting” 
 As Spain entered the post-Franco era in the mid-1970s, a “culture 
of silence” became the norm in a country looking to leave the painful 
truths of the Civil War and ensuing dictatorship in the past.34 This cul-
ture was particularly prevalent in the political realm, where the new 
political elites of both the right and left abided by a tacit, unwritten 
pact known as the “pacto del olvido,” or “pact of forgetting,” when it 
came to the wrongs committed and bitter divisions created during the 
previous four decades.35 As a result, a spirit of consensus pervaded 
Spain’s transitional period from dictatorship to democracy, enabling 
representatives of the old, Francoist order and an opposition seeking a 
quick, complete eradication of Francoism to reform the system through 
the legal framework of the former regime.36 
 In the end, the “pact of forgetting” helped fuel Spain’s remarkable 
political transformation after Franco’s death in 1975 to the extent that 
the nation was able to hold its first peaceful, democratic national elec-
tion under two years after the dictator’s passing.37 For this reason, it is 
still considered a pillar of Spanish democracy.38 A 1977 general amnesty 
law officially codified the pact and served to insulate any who may have 
committed politically-motivated crimes that occurred before the transi-
tion from prosecution.39 Under the Amnesty Law of 1977, which re-
mains in existence today, it was understood that Franco’s allies could 
and would not be tried for any past wrongs.40 
C. Breaking the Silence 
 A movement in favor of breaking the silence surrounding Franco-
era atrocities had been gaining support well ahead of Judge Garzón’s 
proposed investigation, as Spain moved into its third decade removed 
from the democratic transition.41 For instance, since 2000, under the 
auspices of the non-profit Association for the Recovery of Historical 
                                                                                                                      
34 Webster, supra note 1, at 244; see Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
35 Salvadó, supra note 6, at 192; Tremlett, supra note 11; see Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
36 See Carr, supra note 28, at 209, 220–21; Salvadó, supra note 6, at 192. 
37 See Carr, supra note 28, at 227; Salvadó, supra note 6, at 192; Tremlett, supra note 
11. 
38 Fuchs, supra note 2; Nolan, supra note 17. 
39 Amnesty Law (B.O.E. 1977, 24937), available at http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/ 
bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=1977/24937; see Iliopoulos, supra note 13; Ghost 
Story, supra note 10. 
40 See Fuchs, supra note 2; Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
41 See Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
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Memory (ARMH), teams of volunteer forensics, archaeologists, and an-
thropologists have worked to excavate 120 mass graves containing the 
remains of about 1200 people.42 Most recently, Judge Garzón’s planned 
criminal investigation of Franco and his allies for crimes against human-
ity was fueled by around 1200 petitions received from families and asso-
ciations seeking information on victims who disappeared from the be-
ginning of the Civil War to the end of the dictatorship.43 
 The most significant development indicating a newfound momen-
tum toward moving past the “pact of forgetting” was the Spanish Par-
liament’s passage of the Historical Memory Law in 2007, despite sharp 
criticism from the political right.44 The legislation represents the first 
instance in which Spain’s democratic government formally condemned 
the Francoist Civil War activities and the dictatorship that followed.45 
The Law’s stated objective is “recogniz[ing] and widen[ing] the rights 
of those who suffered persecution or violence for political, ideological 
or religious reasons.”46 Its provisions call for a removal of Francoist 
symbols from public places and for town halls to facilitate the exhuma-
tion of the unmarked mass graves.47 The Law also acknowledges that 
the summary trials conducted by Francoist forces against civilians ac-
cused of supporting the Republican government were illegitimate.48 
 Given the promise of the Historical Memory Law and Judge 
Garzón’s initial commitment to criminally investigating Franco-era 
atrocities,49 advocates looking to the state to finally assume responsibil-
ity for exhuming mass graves and pursuing some form of retroactive 
justice were understandably frustrated with the judge’s ultimate deci-
sion to abandon the case.50 Despite the Historical Memory Law’s sym-
bolic promise to support grave exhumation and the victim identifica-
tion process, such efforts are in actuality reliant on weekend volunteers 
and have received little official backing.51 Moreover, turning to the re-
gional courts indicated in Judge Garzón’s November 2008 statement 
                                                                                                                      
42 Elkin, supra note 4. 
43 Id. 
44 See id.; Tremlett, supra note 11. For the full Spanish text of the Historical Memory Law, 
see Historical Memory Law (B.O.E. 2007, 22296), available at http://www.boe.es/aeboe/ 
consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?coleccion=iberlex&id=2007/22296. 




49 See Nolan, supra note 17; Tremlett, supra note 11. 
50 See Burnett, supra note 12. 
51 Id.; Elkin, supra note 4. 
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would likely be futile, as past attempts to prompt these courts to open 
investigations were generally unsuccessful.52 
 Judge Garzón’s decision to drop his High Court investigation of 
crimes against humanity committed under Franco was met with renewed 
international criticism that Spanish courts are more than willing to inves-
tigate such crimes when committed in other countries yet steadfastly re-
fuse to investigate those of the Franco era.53 Amnesty International 
called for Spain to abide by its international obligations and launch an 
effective judicial inquiry into the disappearances of the Franco era in 
November 2008, on the heels of U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
recommendations in the same vein.54 Stakes are thus high in both the 
international and domestic arenas to overcome jurisdictional obstacles 
towards a workable method of investigating the crimes against humanity 
committed in Franco’s Spain.55 
D. Truth Commissions 
 While much of the debate swirling around Judge Garzón’s Octo-
ber 2008 decision to criminally prosecute Franco and thirty-four of his 
supporters centered on the 1977 Amnesty Law and other jurisdictional 
concerns, the question of how a future investigation might be con-
ducted remained open.56 The HRC recommended Spanish considera-
tion of a truth commission for this purpose, which is a suggestion Judge 
Garzón himself had posed in the past.57 
 Depending on the manner in which a truth commission is de-
fined, approximately thirty have been established worldwide.58 These 
bodies have, in general terms, aimed to promote social and political 
healing and reconciliation during a period of democratic transition or 
                                                                                                                      
52 Burnett, supra note 12. 
53 Tremlett, supra note 11; Iliopolous, supra note 13. 
54 Press Release, Amnesty International, Spain: No Global Exception When Investigating 
the Crimes of the Past, AI Index PRE01/285/2008 (Nov. 13, 2008), available at http:// 
www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/spain-no-global-exception-when-investigating- 
crimes-past-20081113 [hereinafter No Global Exception]. 
55 See id.; Burnett, supra note 12. 
56 See, e.g., Tremlett, supra note 11; Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
57 U.N. HRC, 94th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ESP/CO/5 (Oct. 13–31, 2008) [he-
reinafter U.N. HRC, 94th Sess.]; Christopher K. Connolly, Note, Living on the Past: The Role 
of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, 39 Cor-
nell Int’l L.J. 401, 403 (2006). The ARMH currently leading the volunteer initiative for 
mass grave exhumation would also welcome this approach. See Elkin, supra note 4. 
58 Michael Nesbitt, Lessons from the Sam Hinga Norman Decision of the Special Court for Si-
erra Leone: How Trials and Truth Commissions Can Co-exist, 8 German L.J. 977, 979 (2007). 
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post-intrastate conflict.59 While criminal trials are defendant-centric, 
truth commissions are regarded as more victim-focused, as they provide 
an opportunity for direct victims, victims’ relatives, or even perpetrators 
to provide evidence of human rights violations in an official forum.60 
Unlike a court or administrative tribunal setting, in which the primary 
function is adjudication, a truth commission is primarily geared toward 
a fact-finding investigation of past abuses.61 In this way, one commenta-
tor, Mark Freeman, finds truth commissions have provided the interna-
tional community with valuable alternative fora in which “historical jus-
tice” may be obtained for victims and society in cases where traditional 
criminal justice could not be pursued.62 
 Generally, a branch of a state’s domestic government will make the 
decision to sponsor a truth commission and will lay the commission’s 
foundation by appointing its commissioners and establishing its man-
date, or charter.63 As there is no set commission model universally ap-
plicable to states’ individual situations, a state will structure the forum 
to fit its circumstances.64 States thus appoint varied numbers and per-
sonalities accordingly.65 For instance, a commission may be composed 
of all foreigners (El Salvador), all nationals (Uganda), or a combina-
tion of the two (Sierra Leone).66 Ultimately, the body’s composition will 
affect the appearance of independent fact-finding and credibility in the 
eyes of national and international observers.67 
 A truth commission’s mandate, which defines the body’s mission 
and scope of investigation, may likewise be adapted on a case-by-case 
basis to suit a nation’s needs.68 Such a mandate can be broad, as was the 
case with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
                                                                                                                      
59 Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Recon-
ciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 952, 953 (2001). 
60 See Modibo Ocran, Nation Building in Africa and the Role of the Judiciary, 28 N. Ill. U. 
L. Rev. 169, 180 (2008); Patricia M. Wald, Foreword: War Tales and War Trials, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 901, 920 (2008). 
61 See Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness 14 (2006); 
Connolly, supra note 57, at 403–04. 
62 Freeman, supra note 61, at 11 & n.28 (citing Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice 
81–92 (2000)). Freeman defines “historical justice” as “a perception on the part of victims 
and society that the worst crimes of the past have been adequately identified and acknowl-
edged.” Id. at 11 n.28. 
63 See id. at 27–28. 
64 Connolly, supra note 57, at 404–05. 
65 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 29–30 (noting the presence of a few to a dozen com-
missioners as well as individuals of varied educational and professional backgrounds). 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 29. 
68 See Ocran, supra note 60, at 180–81. 
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which was authorized to investigate gross violations of human rights in 
many forms.69 Alternatively, the mandate can be narrowed to an inves-
tigation of very specific events, as was the case with the Chilean Na-
tional Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, which operated within 
a restrictive political environment.70 The Chilean commission’s objec-
tive was limited to investigating and disclosing events that ended in 
death or the presumption of death, and the forum was charged with 
accounting for every person who had been killed or had disappeared, 
and recommending reparation measures.71 
 The mandate will also dictate a commission’s inquiry, subpoena, 
and search and seizure powers.72 History indicates the importance of 
conferring broad powers on a commission in this regard, as blocked 
access to testimony and relevant documents thwarts the forum’s fact-
finding capacity.73 Additionally, statement-taking should occur in con-
venient and widespread locations to promote the participation of vic-
tims, victims’ relatives, or other witnesses.74 The Argentine National 
Commission on the Disappeared provides an exemplary model in this 
respect, as Commission representatives took depositions in a central 
Buenos Aires office and traveled to provincial capitals and remote 
countryside regions to collect stories.75 
 A final, and critical, issue facing states structuring a mandate is that 
of whether and how to hold those who have committed human rights 
abuses accountable.76 Some past truth commission models have pro-
moted the concept of retributive justice by laying the foundation for 
later judicial prosecutions or by assigning responsibility to named indi-
vidual actors in final reports.77 In pursuing retributive justice, it is ex-
                                                                                                                      
69 See Teresa Godwin Phelps, Shattered Voices: Language, Violence, and the 
Work of Truth Commissions 105, 112, 159 n.29 (2004). 
70 See id. at 91–92. 
71 See id. 
72 See Andrew N. Keller, To Name or Not to Name? The Commission for Historical Clarifica-
tion in Guatemala, Its Mandate, and the Decision Not to Identify Individual Perpetrators, 13 Fla. J. 
Int’l L. 289, 302 (2001). 
73 See Stahn, supra note 59, at 955; see also Keller, supra note 72, at 302 (noting the diffi-
culties faced by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification given it could not 
subpoena witnesses and did not possess search and seizure powers). 
74 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 302. 
75 See Phelps, supra note 69, at 83–84. 
76 See Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on 
Restorative Justice, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions 68, 74–75 
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
77 See Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions 107–08 (2002); Kiss, supra note 76, at 75. Hayner finds that although the 
majority of truth commissions had the authority to name offenders, few have exercised this 
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pected that implicating evidence is proven relevant, probative, and reli-
able, and that named offenders would have the opportunity to defend 
their names according to accepted norms of procedural fairness.78 In 
other instances, commissions have served as alternatives to trials rather 
than leading to them, and have opted against naming individual perpe-
trators in final reports.79 As the Guatemalan Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH) mandate demonstrates, this model may be adopted 
by necessity to avoid potential legal or political hurdles entangled with 
prosecution, such as threats of civil and military unrest.80 Other im-
pediments may include political amnesty provisions, due process con-
cerns affecting the rights of the accused, and statutes of limitation.81 Al-
though cases leaving perpetrators unnamed lack a retributive justice 
element, observers such as Elizabeth Kiss suggest that certain “restora-
tive justice” benefits emerge, including: affirming and restoring the dig-
nity of human rights victims, acknowledging the atrocities they suffered, 
and fostering respect of human rights in a society where past divisions 
may be reconciled.82 
II. Discussion 
A. 1977 Amnesty Law 
 A principal obstacle critics have cited in regards to any criminal in-
vestigation of Franco and the named officers under him is domestic leg-
islation in the form of the 1977 Amnesty Law.83 There are two prongs to 
the argument that international law compels Spain to prosecute Franco 
and his allies for crimes against humanity regardless of this apparent 
                                                                                                                      
power. Hayner, supra note 77, at 107–08 (citing El Salvador, Chad, the second commission 
of the African National Congress, and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission). 
78 See Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty’s Justice, in Truth v. Justice, supra note 76, at 189, 203 
(noting that even if criminal prosecution does not follow, naming an individual a mur-
derer or torturer has serious consequences, which warrants certain due process protec-
tions); Freeman, supra note 61, at 314. 
79 See Hayner, supra note 77; Kiss, supra note 76, at 75. 
80 See Keller, supra note 72, at 290, 298, 300; Kiss, supra note 76, at 75. The CEH man-
date reflected a peaceful political compromise between the Guatemalan State and the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, a leftist guerilla group. Keller, supra note 72, at 
290, 298. The mandate prohibited attributing responsibility to individual offenders and 
stipulated the end report would have no “judicial aim or effect.” Id. at 300. 
81 Kiss, supra note 76, at 75. 
82 See id. at 79. 
83 See Burnett, supra note 12; Ghost Story, supra note 10. 
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roadblock.84 First, leaving nullum crimen sine lege concerns aside for a 
moment,85 Spain must abide by its international treaty obligations,86 
namely, its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), as the U.N. HRC recently observed in its Oc-
tober 2008 recommendations to Spain.87 The ICCPR’s Article 7 stipu-
lates that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”88 The HRC viewed the atrocities 
committed during the Franco era as crimes against humanity that fit this 
definition, thus requiring investigation.89 In addition, the HRC has pre-
viously read Article 7 with Article 2 to require the appropriate authori-
ties in member countries to investigate such acts, hold those found 
guilty of their commission responsible, and provide effective remedies 
for victims, including the right to compensation.90 The HRC’s October 
2008 recommendations insisted amnesties for serious violations of hu-
man rights, such as the 1977 Amnesty Law, are incompatible with the 
ICCPR, and called Spain’s attention to its General Comment No. 20 
(1992) for confirmation of the issue.91 Judge Garzón’s November 2008 
statement similarly asserted that amnesty enforcement is irreconcilable 
                                                                                                                      
84 See U.N. HRC, 94th Sess., supra note 57 (treaty obligations); Roman Boed, The Effect of 
a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human 
Rights Violations, 33 Cornell Int’l L.J. 297, 314 (2000) (customary international law). 
85 See infra Part II.C. 
86 The Spanish Constitution of 1978 mandates that “validly concluded international 
treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall constitute part of [Spain’s] internal legal 
order.” C.E. art. 96, § 1. 
87 See U.N. HRC, 94th Sess., supra note 57. Spain ratified the ICCPR on April 27, 1977, 
and the pact was officially published in Spain three days later. Amnesty Int’l (Spain), Es-
paña: La obligación de investigar los crímenes del pasado y garantizar los derechos de las víctimas de 
desaparición forzada durante la Guerra Civil y el franquismo, AI Index EUR410008-20809, Nov. 
2008, at 25 [hereinafter La obligación de investigar]. 
88 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
89 See U.N. HRC, 94th Sess., supra note 57. It is noteworthy that the HRC recognizes an 
additional element of torture inherent to forced disappearances, whereby the family of a 
victim suffers torture in the form of stress, anguish, and incertitude when victims or their 
remains have not been identified. See La obligación de investigar, supra note 87, at 20. Such a 
situation represents a violation of the ICCPR and a further reason to investigate. See id. 
90 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights 
Violations in International Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 449, 477 (1990). 
91 U.N. HRC, 94th Sess., supra note 57; see also U.N. HRC, General Comment No. 20: Arti-
cle 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 
¶¶ 14–15, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (Mar. 10, 1992) (pertaining to appropriate re-
dress and amnesties). Provided that the Amnesty Law was enacted on October 15, 1977, 
after Spain had ratified the ICCPR and bound itself to the international responsibilities 
therein, the amnesty arguably may not be considered a domestic “preconstitutional norm.” 
La obligación de investigar, supra note 87, at 25. 
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with the ICCPR and stressed that Article 15, Section 2 in no way admits 
political exceptions to punishing individuals for criminal acts against the 
law of nations.92 
 Secondly, commentators such as M. Cherif Bassiouni argue that 
customary international law has recognized crimes against humanity for 
over a half-century and includes a duty to prosecute those who have al-
legedly committed such crimes.93 This position finds consensus across a 
variety of sources.94 For one, grants of amnesty to offenders would clash 
with the concept of individual criminal responsibility contained in the 
Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, which prevented those responsible 
for crimes against humanity from enjoying any possibility of immunity.95 
The position also finds support in the Rome Statute’s Preamble, which 
states that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdic-
tion over those responsible for international crimes,” as well as Article 5 
of the recent Draft International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance.96 Finally, an array of resolutions 
advances a customary duty to prosecute, regardless of amnesties.97 For 
instance, Judge Garzón highlights a 1984 Council of Europe Parliamen-
tary Assembly Resolution that calls member state governments to rec-
ognize enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity that “may 
not be covered by amnesty laws.”98 
 In reality, however, it is unclear whether international law obligates 
countries to prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity in a case 
                                                                                                                      
92 Judge Garzón’s Statement, supra note 20, at 91; see ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 15, § 2. 
93 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in Crimes of War: What the Public 
Should Know 135, 136 (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007); see Boed, supra note 84, at 
314. Bassiouni would add crimes against humanity are non-derogable jus cogens crimes, 
strengthening the obligation to prosecute. See Bassiouni, supra note 93, at 136. For further 
discussion of jus cogens implications regarding conflicting national law, see infra Part II.B. 
94 See Boed, supra note 84, at 315–16; Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Ju-
risdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 507, 519 (1999). 
95 Scharf, supra note 94, at 519. 
96 Boed, supra note 84, at 316; Iliopoulos, supra note 13 (noting Article 5 states that 
“the widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime 
against humanity . . . and shall attract the consequences provided for under such applica-
ble international law”). Spain has signed but not yet ratified this Convention, which re-
quires twenty ratifications to enter into force. Iliopoulos, supra note 13. 
97 See Boed, supra note 84, at 314–15; Scharf, supra note 94, at 520. Boed cites two spe-
cific U.N. General Assembly Resolutions to illustrate: a 1971 Resolution concerning the 
punishment of war criminals and persons who have committed crimes against humanity, 
and a 1973 Resolution on principles of international cooperation in the detection, arrest, 
extradition, and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Boed, supra note 84, at 315. 
98 Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution 828 on Enforced Disappearances, 9th Sess., Doc. No. 5273 
(1984); Judge Garzón’s Statement, supra note 20, at 47. 
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where a domestic amnesty law is at stake.99 Despite potential interpreta-
tions of ICCPR obligations, there is no specialized convention explicitly 
compelling states to take a particular action in regards to crimes against 
humanity, as opposed to crimes of genocide or torture.100 The argu-
ment for compelled prosecution must therefore lie in the uncertain 
existence of customary law.101 This position is inherently weak, for, as 
customary law requires a uniform state practice and state practice is not 
uniform in this area, one would be hard-pressed to say a domestic am-
nesty violates a customary “duty” to prosecute.102 
 For example, several countries transitioning to democracy have 
chosen to pass amnesty laws covering individuals who committed hu-
man rights abuses as part of former, repressive dictatorial regimes.103 In 
some of these cases, the U.N. actually endorsed these amnesties as 
measures designed to restore peace and solidify democratic govern-
ments.104 Moreover, as Scharf criticizes, binding customary law demands 
deeds rather than words.105 Those claiming customary law bars amnes-
ties cite “non-binding General Assembly Resolutions, hortative declara-
tions of international conferences, and international conventions that 
are not widely ratified” instead of any consistent state action to the con-
trary.106 The Rome Statute itself may even be interpreted to protect am-
nesties.107 
 Lastly, from a practical standpoint, calling Spain to simply abandon 
the amnesty, as the U.N. Human Rights Committee has suggested, ap-
pears unrealistic.108 All three of Spain’s professional judicial groups, 
which represent jurists on both the right and left, are in agreement that 
legally prosecuting Franco and his allies would be a mistake.109 An in-
vestigation would be in direct conflict with an amnesty considered a 
                                                                                                                      
99 See Boed, supra note 84, at 314, 316. 
100 Id. But see No Global Exception, supra note 54 (citing Spain’s obligations as a party 
to the ICCPR). 
101 See Boed, supra note 84, at 314, 316. 
102 See id. at 314, 316–17. 
103 See Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, 34 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 373, 373 (2006). 
104 Id. 
105 Scharf, supra note 94, at 520. 
106 Id. 
107 Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a 
Distributive Problem, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 293, 317–19 (2005). In particular, Newman 
notes Article 53(1)(c) would allow deference to a national amnesty program, as the provi-
sion permits the Prosecutor to opt against investigation where “[a] prosecution is not in 
the interests of justice” under the circumstances. Id. at 317. 
108 See U.N. HRC, 94th Sess., supra note 57; Nolan, supra note 17. 
109 Nolan, supra note 17. 
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“pillar of democracy,” and which allowed Spaniards to leave a painful 
past behind them in favor of a peaceful political transformation.110 
B. Statute of Limitations 
 A second potential obstacle in the way of criminally investigating 
Franco and his supporters lies in domestic application of a statute of 
limitations.111 In November 2008, the Spanish Prosecutor’s Office chal-
lenged Judge Garzón to abide by the statute of limitations under the 
Spanish criminal code in force at the outset of the Civil War, as it was 
this code that would have been applicable to the alleged criminal acts 
committed.112 The acts in question under the code at that time would 
have been considered “ordinary crimes” with a now-expired statute of 
limitations.113 Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s Office argued that even if 
the judge looked to current Spanish law, most crimes are said to have 
lapsed after a twenty-year period.114 
 Judge Garzón initially countered the applicability of the statute of 
limitations argument under the progressive theory that as the bodies of 
Franco-era victims are still missing, the crime of “enforced disappear-
ance” continues to this day.115 Thus, the statute would not apply to a 
still-open case.116 The principal argument against the application of the 
statutory bar in the present context of an investigation into crimes 
against humanity, however, is that such crimes are not subject to a stat-
ute of limitations under international law.117 There is now a general 
consensus among international authorities that crimes against human-
ity are non-derogable jus cogens crimes under international law, the 
highest standing international law affords, which would imply that 
states should prosecute these crimes regardless of statutes of limita-
tions.118 This implication finds support in both the Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and explicitly in Ar-
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ticle 29 of the Rome Statute.119 Although in the past it was still ques-
tionable as to whether customary law precluded statutory limitations as 
applied to crimes against humanity, the widespread adoption of the 
2002 Rome Statute indicates a customary norm against their applicabil-
ity.120 In a trend corresponding to this principle, some states have be-
gun adopting provisions abolishing statutes of limitations as applied to 
certain jus cogens crimes.121 For these reasons, international law scholar 
Leila Nadya Sadat concludes that even though the manner in which a 
state chooses to apply international law is generally left to the individ-
ual state, the better rule when a jus cogens crime is at stake is that states 
are bound via international law to apply international over national 
rules, including statutes of limitations.122 
C. The Nullum Crimen Sine Lege Principle 
 A third and major concern that must be confronted when dealing 
with a concept of retroactive justice involving an international crime is 
the fundamental principle of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without 
a law”).123 In short, the principle demands that “no one [should] be 
held criminally responsible and punished when at the time the crime 
was committed, this did not constitute an offense under national or 
international law.”124 This norm is codified in various human rights 
sources and is designed both to prevent excessive judicial discretion 
and to ensure an alleged offender will be fully conscious of the “severe 
consequences which may flow from the criminal process.”125 The criti-
                                                                                                                      
119 See Bassiouni, supra note 93, at 135–36 (citing article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Char-
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cal question in attempting to prosecute those allegedly responsible for 
acts committed during the Franco era presently classified as crimes 
against humanity is whether international law during the Franco era 
clearly established such acts were crimes against humanity.126 Judge 
Garzón respects this concern, although he raises two potential argu-
ments against the applicability of the nullum crimen principle.127 
 First, the same reasoning Judge Garzón applied to the statute of 
limitations issue, that the crime of enforced disappearance is a crime 
against humanity that continues to this day, would seem to challenge 
the nullum crimen argument.128 This argument would fail as a result of 
present-day understanding that crimes against humanity, such as en-
forced disappearance, are jus cogens crimes under international law, and 
therefore currently prosecutable.129 The Rome Conference evaluated 
this concept of “continuous crimes” as part of the non-retroactivity 
principle of Article 24 that was considered in line with the nullum cri-
men standard codified in Article 22 of the Rome Statute.130 The Confer-
ence could not establish a consensus around this sensitive topic and 
deliberately left Article 24’s language ambiguous for the ICC’s deter-
mination when confronted with alleged disappearances commenced 
before the Statute entered into force and then continued thereafter.131 
The status of nullum crimen as affected by “continued crimes” thus re-
mains unresolved.132 
 The second argument raised is that if international law recognized 
crimes against humanity at the time of the Nuremberg trials (1945), 
international law recognized crimes against humanity stemming from 
the beginning of the Spanish Civil War occurring a relatively short time 
earlier.133 Judge Garzón’s initial plan was to investigate within the pe-
riod of 1936 to 1952, a scope that could be expected to encompass the 
majority of Franco-era atrocities, which were likely committed from 
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129 See Sadat, supra note 118, at 974. 
130 Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in The International Criminal 
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131 Id. at 196–97. 
132 See id. at 197. 
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1936 to 1945.134 Judge Garzón asserted the Nuremberg proceedings 
were intended to cover a period beginning on January, 30, 1933—
sufficiently earlier than the 1936 Spanish Civil War such that Franco 
and the named officers could legitimately be accused of crimes against 
humanity.135 
 In reality, it is problematic to suggest crimes against humanity were 
established criminal acts under international law at a time pre-dating 
Nuremberg.136 Prior to Nuremberg, international crimes were vaguely 
understood, and the Tribunals had the task of defining their elements 
for the first time.137 For this reason, the Nuremberg trials themselves 
have been criticized for applying international law ex post facto to acts 
not explicitly declared illegal at the time of commission.138 The Nur-
emberg trials are instead best viewed as the initial point of confirmation 
that crimes against humanity would be punishable under international 
law.139 
 The argument against applying the nullum crimen sine lege principle 
to a criminal investigation of Franco-era atrocities may therefore de-
pend on the unclear status of enforced disappearance as a “continuous 
crime.”140 In such a situation, the Rome Statute’s Article 22 instructs 
that when ambiguous, the definition of a crime “shall be interpreted in 
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted, or convicted.”141 
D. Due Process Concerns 
 A final hurdle to be encountered in any form of criminal prosecu-
tion of Franco and his allies is preserving the rights of the accused.142 
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The reality of pursuing retroactive justice for acts committed seventy 
years ago is that the alleged perpetrators are now deceased, as are the 
majority of survivors or other first-hand witnesses of the acts.143 There-
fore, any live testimony would likely be dependent on the children of 
the era who observed or otherwise had knowledge of the atrocities, in-
dividuals who have been provided accounts from past generations, and 
whatever documentation could be obtained from the period.144 Al-
though international criminal law does not bar the admission of hear-
say or indirect evidence,145 it does maintain the ideal that even indi-
viduals accused of the most serious crimes a human being could 
perpetrate are entitled to a set of basic due process rights.146 
 The IMT afforded only limited due process rights to the accused, 
likely due to the extreme horrors before the court and the inherent 
difficulty of balancing these rights with society’s collective need for jus-
tice.147 Nevertheless, the IMT Charter and Rules of Procedure did pro-
vide an early set of due process guarantees now considered fundamen-
tal to international criminal procedure, including the rights to conduct 
a defense, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses.148 Since Nur-
emberg, the right of the accused to a fair trial has become a well-
established principle in international, as well as domestic, legal frame-
works.149 Article 14 of the ICCPR has been viewed as the modern in-
strument of human rights law reflective of the internationally recog-
nized standards for the rights encompassed in the fair trial concept.150 
The Article, echoing its IMT predecessor, solidified the rights of ac-
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cused individuals to be tried in person, defend themselves, and exam-
ine the witnesses testifying against them, among others.151 
 Due to the previously mentioned realities of adjudicating alleged 
crimes against humanity seventy years after their occurrence, the ac-
cused would obviously be unable to defend themselves personally at 
trial152 or to confront any testimony or evidence against them.153 The 
general rule is that international criminal proceedings do not in prin-
ciple accept trials in absentia, which would clearly be required in the 
case at hand.154 It is true that the HRC, as well as the Rome Statute and 
ICCPR observe certain, but very limited, exceptions to this rule.155 Even 
in cases of these exceptions, however, the accused are always informed 
of the proceedings against them and provided at least an initial right to 
attend their trials.156 
 One would thus seem hard-pressed to say any traditional trial me-
thod could apply to the cases of Franco and his allies to yield fair pro-
ceedings in accordance with the international standard.157 This is par-
ticularly the case given the likely quantity of indirect accounts, as well as 
the age of the evidence.158 In such a situation, underlying reliability and 
credibility would certainly be at issue, placing even more emphasis on 
an accused individual’s ability to personally examine and challenge the 
evidence for the sake of establishing legitimacy.159 
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III. Analysis 
A. Respecting Jurisdictional Concerns and Victims’ Rights 
 Of the four jurisdictional obstacles discussed in this Note, all but 
one would bar trial or another form of individual criminal prosecution 
of Franco and the thirty-four generals and ministers named in Judge 
Garzón’s October 2008 statement.160 A statute of limitations alone 
would not block criminal action, given its inapplicability to jus cogens 
crimes according to customary international law.161 Nevertheless, the 
remaining three hurdles—the 1977 Amnesty Law, the nullum crimen 
principle, and due process concerns—cannot be overcome.162 The 
1977 amnesty would remain intact due to practical domestic realities 
and the unclear status of international law relating to a duty to prose-
cute when confronted with amnesty law.163 Spain must also recognize 
the nullum crimen norm, as crimes against humanity were not estab-
lished criminal acts when allegedly committed.164 Finally, the legitimacy 
and fairness of criminal proceedings demand the accused have the op-
portunity to attend, mount a defense, and challenge evidence pre-
sented against them.165 This is an impossibility in the present case in-
volving alleged crimes committed seventy years ago.166 
 Although these three jurisdictional obstacles would preclude a 
criminal prosecution of individual Francoists for crimes against human-
ity, this does not mean Spain should abandon all forms of investiga-
tion.167 Internationally, Spain has subscribed to the recognition of vic-
tims’ rights as a party to two critical treaties: the ICCPR and Rome 
Statute.168 In addition, as a member of the international community, 
Spain is obliged to respect the fact that Franco-era victims suffered 
from what are now recognized as crimes so grave as to warrant jus cogens 
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status—the highest standing in the hierarchy of international legal 
norms.169 Barring the jurisdictional obstacles in large part stemming 
from the fact that the acts were committed several decades ago, crimi-
nal investigations should not be dismissed.170 
 On the domestic front, the Spanish government has also recently 
committed itself to broadening the rights of Franco-era victims in some 
measure via 2007’s Historical Memory Law.171 The legislation included 
a mandate for town halls to facilitate the exhumation of unmarked 
mass graves and widen symbolic monetary compensations for victims or 
their survivors, although this has generally not come to fruition.172 
 A truth commission would be an invaluable forum through which 
Spain could acknowledge its legal obligations internationally and do-
mestically, formally recognize the suffering of victims, and grant some 
degree of closure to victims’ families.173 At the same time, as past ex-
perience indicates, the forum could be carefully structured to suit the 
needs of the host country.174 In Spain’s case, the commission should 
accommodate the rights of the accused in respecting the 1977 Amnesty 
Law and the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and due process.175 
B. Structuring a Truth Commission 
 The Spanish government should narrowly construct the mandate 
for a truth commission toward the victim-centered objective of investi-
gating the circumstances surrounding a disappeared victim’s death, 
thus resembling the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Rec-
onciliation model.176 The Spanish commission’s ultimate goal should 
similarly be a report containing victims’ names, dates and causes of 
death, and probable burial location (if known).177 Additionally, this re-
port would list mass grave site locations in need of exhumation and a 
plan for state funding of this initiative and other symbolic monetary 
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compensation for victims or their survivors.178 In this way, the mandate 
would largely agree with the 2007 Historical Memory Law and Judge 
Garzón’s objectives in his original decision to criminally investigate 
Franco-era atrocities.179 
 Nevertheless, given the need to respect the obstacles of the 1977 
Amnesty Law and principles of nullum crimen and due process in any 
investigation, the Spanish truth commission should differ from Judge 
Garzón’s initial plan in a significant way.180 Although Judge Garzón’s 
October 2008 statement named Franco and thirty-four other individu-
als as the subjects of a planned criminal investigation, a Spanish truth 
commission must forego naming individual actors in final reports, as 
well as any further judicial prosecutions against alleged offenders, simi-
lar to the Guatemalan CEH example.181 Any future criminal investiga-
tion of individuals based on commission findings would breach the 
1977 Amnesty Law and violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.182 
Moreover, as naming individual offenders in a report would trigger the 
due process right of the accused to defend themselves, this option must 
be dismissed.183 The uniqueness of the Spanish case should be re-
spected in the fact that the acts in question may be up to seventy years 
old and concern now-deceased actors, as opposed to other commis-
sions that have dealt with events from a more recent past, which were 
capable of accommodating the rights of the accused if naming them.184 
 Lastly, the mandate’s provisions in regards to the commission’s 
evidentiary powers and composition would provide additional rein-
forcement of the body’s victim-centered mission and protection of the 
rights of the accused.185 The commission should be vested with broad 
subpoena and search and seizure powers to collect testimony and build 
on the documentation Judge Garzón had already solicited from gov-
ernment archives, city halls, the Catholic Church, and the keepers of 
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Franco’s tomb.186 The body would thus possess full fact-finding powers 
even if it were to encounter political opposition to its efforts.187 The 
commission should likewise provide wide accessibility for statement-
taking, using the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared 
model as an example.188 Reaching out to potential witnesses across the 
country is particularly necessary in the Spanish case, given the probable 
advanced age of any with direct knowledge of the acts in question and 
the fact that mass graves are located throughout the countryside.189 
 In terms of composition, the current Socialist government of 
Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero would be wise to engage 
leaders from both ends of the political spectrum in consultation to-
wards the selection of commissioners in order to facilitate a fair balance 
of opinion, and thus bolster the legitimacy of the body’s findings.190 To 
further enhance the commission’s capacity for independent, credible 
fact-finding, appointees should include a combination of foreign and 
national legal experts.191 The presence of international experts would 
promote objective inquiry against what has been a fierce partisan de-
bate surrounding the investigation of alleged crimes against human-
ity.192 The participation of national legal experts, who would ideally be 
nominated by both the left and right, would ensure the body’s respect 
of Spanish legal culture and a vested interest in the country’s welfare.193 
Furthermore, the inclusion of nominees from the right would likely 
serve as a further check on evidentiary reliability and assurance that the 
rights of the accused are observed in the investigation process.194 
 Although the aforementioned proposal for a Spanish truth com-
mission would not result in a sense of retributive justice for surviving 
victims and victims’ relatives, the plan would likely afford significant 
benefits in the way of restorative justice.195 The model would affirm the 
dignity of the victims of Franco-era atrocities via collected stories that 
would shed light on their suffering and allow their lives to be properly 
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memorialized.196 The commission’s final report would also represent a 
historical document that officially acknowledges that abuses were 
committed, particularly through recommendations of symbolic repara-
tions to families and state support of mass grave exhumation, even if 
individual offenders’ names are omitted.197 Finally, the plan would 
demonstrate a commitment to human rights to both the national and 
international communities, while also allowing a now-mature Spanish 
democracy to take a meaningful step toward breaking the silence sur-
rounding its painful history and healing past divisions.198 
Conclusion 
 Despite the fact that individual criminal prosecution of Franco and 
the thirty-four generals and ministers named in Judge Baltasar Garzón’s 
October 2008 statement may face insurmountable legal obstacles, Spain 
can still achieve a form of retroactive justice for Franco-era crimes 
against humanity via a truth commission. The three hurdles consisting 
of Spain’s 1977 Amnesty Law, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and 
the necessity of protecting the due process rights of the accused, must 
all be respected to the point of foregoing retributive justice. Neverthe-
less, an alternative forum toward achieving restorative justice for victims 
and victims’ families exists in the form of a truth commission. This fo-
rum could be molded both to accommodate the obstacles unique to the 
Spanish situation and to permit the nation to honor international and 
domestic legal responsibilities. The Spanish truth commission’s man-
date would provide for widespread statement-taking and document col-
lection that would support a final report describing the circumstances 
surrounding victims’ deaths, identifying victims’ ultimate resting places, 
and providing symbolic reparation recommendations. The mandate 
would additionally preclude naming alleged offenders in the report and 
any future prosecution of these individuals to preserve the rights of the 
accused. In this way, the Spanish truth commission would represent a 
fair, victim-centered forum capable of promoting the restorative aims of 
affirming victim dignity, formally acknowledging historical atrocities, 
and allowing the nation to begin closing its old wounds in earnest. 
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